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IN THE TURBULENT WAKE OF ANDERSON V. BELL: PROTECTING 
CORE POLITICAL SPEECH AND UTAHNS’ RIGHT TO INITIATIVE 
 
Daniel W. Boyer* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Utah adopted a statutory initiative and 
referendum process whereby citizens could pass laws and suspend statutes by 
gathering enough signatures to place an issue on a statewide ballot for voting.1 
Initiatives provided citizens a means of engaging directly in the state lawmaking 
process by drafting proposed bills. Similarly, through popular referenda, citizens 
could challenge and potentially repeal specific acts of the legislature. Since its 
inception, this democratic process has had a troubled existence and seen many 
obstacles. 2  For several years after its ratification in 1900, the constitutional 
amendment granting Utah citizens the right to initiative remained ineffectual due 
to the legislature’s failure to pass reasonable implementing laws.3 Not until over 
sixteen years later did initiative and referenda proponents finally influence the 
legislature to pass an implementing bill.4 As M. Dane Waters, founder of the 
Initiative and Referendum Institute, notes, however, this first bill “was worthless.”5 
“[I]t specified that anyone signing a petition to put an initiative on the ballot had to 
sign ‘in the office and in the presence of an officer competent to administer 
oaths.’” 6  This stifled early initiative and referendum efforts by preventing 
circulation of petitions throughout voting districts. Not until 1960 did Utahns 
finally pass a citizen initiative.7 
More recently, initiative and referenda proponents have encountered 
resistance from the legislature in the form of Senate Bill 165 (S.B. 165), which 
categorically banned use of electronic signatures gathered on the Internet. The bill 
effectively stifles Internet circulation efforts, which provide citizens a secure and 
effective way to disseminate political information. The Utah legislature has also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
* © 2013 Daniel W. Boyer, J.D. candidate, 2013, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. 
1 UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (guaranteeing that “the legal voters . . . may . . . 
initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption upon 
a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or . . . require any 
law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the 
members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the State, 
as provided by statute, before the law may take effect”). 
2 See M. DANE WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 400 (2003). 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (quoting Direct Legislation Elections, 1917 Utah Laws 188, 190). 
7 Id. 
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prohibited the use of e-signatures in election drives conducted under Utah’s 
Election Code, which allows candidates for state office who are unaffiliated with a 
registered political party to collect and submit signatures from registered voters so 
that their name may be placed on the official, statewide ballot.8 Such signatures 
must be holographic—that is, handwritten—to qualify candidates for the public 
vote.9 
This Note addresses the constitutionality of these recent measures that annul 
the legal effect of e-signatures in grassroots political movements. Specifically, it 
will examine how S.B. 165 has violated Utah voters’ core political speech rights 
by creating an undue burden on both grassroots political campaigns and circulation 
of initiatives and referenda. This examination proceeds in two parts. Part I provides 
a historical context of the use of electronic signatures in the commercial and 
electoral activities of the United States. It then narrows its focus to examine Utah’s 
checkered legislative history regarding the use of e-signatures for both electoral 
petitions and initiative and referenda movements. This turbulent history came to a 
head with Farley Anderson’s abbreviated rise to candidacy for governor and the 
controversy that spurred the Utah Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Anderson v. 
Bell.10 Part I concludes by documenting the legislature’s response to Anderson, 
exposing both the haste and lack of substantiation with which it enacted S.B. 165. 
Part II attempts to do, in part, what the court declined to do in Anderson: 
address the merits of Anderson’s constitutional claims. Specifically, Part II 
analyzes Anderson’s claims under a free-speech rubric, taking his case as 
representative of past and future actions in which the constitutionally vested right 
to engage in core political speech by circulating voting petitions and initiatives is 
threatened. Utah plaintiffs have generally avoided raising this species of 
constitutional challenge, relying instead upon Utah’s uniform operation of laws 
provision, which, like the equal protection clause, provides that “persons similarly 
situated should be treated similarly.”11 Ultimately, a free-speech challenge cuts 
closer to the constitutional harm caused by S.B. 165 than the uniform operation of 
laws challenges brought by plaintiffs in earlier initiative and referenda cases, such 
as Gallivan v. Walker.12  Whereas uniform operation of laws challenges were 
successful in preventing rural Utah counties from exercising disproportionate 
voting power over multicounty petitions, they likely would not succeed against the 
new constitutional harm brought by S.B. 165. Absent a clear discriminatory 
practice on the part of the government in applying the ban on e-signatures, a free-
speech challenge more accurately identifies the constitutional violation. S.B. 165 
thwarts the politically expressive conduct of the voter memorialized in signature, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-101(18)(a)–(b) (West 2012). 
9 Id. (defining “[s]ignature” as “a holographic signature” and providing that it “does 
not mean an electronic signature”). 
10 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010). 
11 Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002). 
12 See id. at 1087. 
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as well as the persuasive communication preceding it. The First Amendment 
protects both of these stages in a petition-gathering effort. 
Ultimately, any state action that unilaterally seeks to limit a group of voters’ 
access to the ballot deserves strictest scrutiny, and the legislature’s action cannot 
withstand this scrutiny because S.B. 165 unduly burdens petitioner gatherers’ 
interest in the franchise, which is inviolable. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  E-signatures in American Commerce and Elections 
 
The issue of authentication, often raised in electronic signature disputes, has 
haunted nonholographic signatures since the telegraph. An early example, Howley 
v. Whipple,13  involved a boundary dispute between two landowners near the 
Canadian border in New Hampshire where the trial court excluded a telegraphic 
communication made by the plaintiffs, which they had hoped would establish the 
location of one of their party members on a key date in dispute.14 The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire upheld the trial court’s exclusion, opining that the 
telegraphic communication was inadmissible hearsay because an operator in New 
Hampshire had copied the original message of the sender in Montreal.15 The court, 
however, acknowledged a widely accepted practice of contracting over the 
telegraph—a practice that complied with the writing requirement under the Statute 
of Frauds.16 The court concluded that it does not make “any difference that in one 
case common record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle fluid, known 
as electricity, performs the same office.”17 Howley thus reasoned through the legal 
equivalency of the two media—ink and electricity—as premised upon a more basic 
similarity between their physical properties as fluids. The case stands for a 
growing awareness in late nineteenth-century jurisprudence that the “subtle” 
difference between the two media was only a matter of degree, not category. In the 
last analysis, what mattered was the intent of the signor, not the form of the 
signature. 
The advent of computers, and subsequently the Internet, prompted a complete 
restructuring of the commercial landscape. Electronic signatures have now become 
the norm in memorializing interstate business transactions.18 In 2000, Congress 
passed the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
13 48 N.H. 487 (1869). 
14 See id. at 487. 
15 Id. at 489. 
16 Id. at 488. 
17 Id. 
18 See Take on Tech: E-Signatures Become the Norm (MarketWatch Radio Network 
Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/e-signatures-become-the-
norm-2012-09-06-10107192. 
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intended to facilitate the implementation of electronic records and signatures in 
interstate and foreign commerce by safeguarding the validity of contracts entered 
into electronically.19 This law preempts state efforts to limit parties to signing 
business agreements only with holographic, paper signatures.20 Although ESIGN 
provides for the continued validity of holographic signatures, it clearly stands for a 
federal endorsement of the shift to e-business. 
Concurrent with this shift, several states began implementing programs 
allowing citizens to vote over the Internet by using electronic signatures in place of 
paper ballots. Just prior to the controversial 2000 ballot count that prompted the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,21 a lesser-known historic event 
occurred. Among the tens of millions of ballots cast and counted that year, eighty-
four had been submitted online by citizens overseas.22 The implementation of the 
Internet as a tool for democracy raised several questions. On the one hand, 
proponents of Internet voting felt that it was a natural transition for the franchise 
and would make voting accessible to those individuals who might otherwise have 
difficulty visiting the polls, such as those in wheelchairs, military and executive 
personnel overseas, busy single parents, and youth between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-five who consume nearly all of their information online.23 
On the other hand, critics of an Internet-driven election process noted the 
security risks involved in maintaining online databases where votes would be 
stored. 24  In 2000, hackers infiltrated and shut down several large corporate 
websites, including Amazon.com, Buy.com, CNN.com, eBay.com, and 
Yahoo.com.25 In 2001, over a quarter-million computers suffered from the Code 
Red worm, which caused the Department of Defense to close many websites to 
public access until prophylactic measures could be developed. 26  Given the 
prevalence of these breaches, critics reasoned, how could the American electorate 
expect its voting information to be stored any more securely? Another emerging 
criticism of electronic voting was that it created a “digital gap” in the electorate, 
where race and socioeconomic status correlated with access to efficient and 
reliable Internet networks.27 Some argued that wealthy, white homeowners would 
have more control over the franchise should the electronic vote replace the paper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
19 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7031 (2006). 
20 See Carol S. Weissert & Sanford F. Schram, The State of U.S. Federalism, 1999–
2000, PUBLIUS, Winter 2000, at 1, 6. 
21 53 U.S. 98 (2000). 
22 R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK, AND VOTE: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNET VOTING 2 (2004). 
23 See id. at 5–6. 
24 See id. at 7. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 8–9. 
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ballot.28 Despite these concerns, in 2012, over thirty states allowed military and 
overseas voters to return ballots by email, a web portal, or by fascimile.29 
 
B.  E-Signatures in Utah Commerce, Elections, and Article 6 Initiatives 
 
As in other states, Utah laws have consistently recognized the validity of 
nonholographic signatures. In Salt Lake City v. Hanson,30 for instance, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that stamped signatures made by a magistrate and 
arresting officers in a criminal matter created a valid and binding warrant for the 
arrest of misdemeanants.31 The court emphasized that the form of the signature did 
not matter; whether “by finger or thumb prints, by a cross or other mark, or by any 
type of mechanically reproduced or stamped facsimile,” a nonholographic 
signature functioned just “as effectively as by [the signor’s] own handwriting.”32 
Hanson thus presents an early example of Utah’s adoption of the common law 
principle that “it is the intent rather than the form of the act that is important.”33 
Currently, the e-signature provides manifestation of mutual assent for a 
significant portion of business transactions in Utah. In 2000, Utah adopted the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),34 becoming one of the first of forty-
seven states to model the federal ESIGN act. 35  The UETA provided Utah 
businesses, legal practitioners, and governmental agencies with speed, efficiency, 
and cost benefits, while promoting reliability and authenticity in online dealings.36 
To facilitate these various transactions, the new law pronounced, “If a law requires 
a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.”37 Moreover, it plainly stated, 
“A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely 
because it is in electronic form.”38 Given these legislative protections against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
28 Id. at 8. 
29 PAMELA SMITH, MICHELLE MULDER & SUSANNAH GOODMAN, COUNTING VOTES 
2012: A STATE BY STATE LOOK AT ELECTION PREPAREDNESS 81 (2012), available at 
http://countingvotes.org/sites/default/files/CountingVotes2012_Final_August2012.pdf; 
T.C. Sotteck, Why Can’t You Vote Online?, VERGE (Oct. 11, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/10/11/3479170/why-cant-you-vote-online-elections-us. 
30 425 P.2d 773 (1967). 
31 See id. at 774. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 2000 Utah Laws 244 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to  
-503 (West 2012)). 
35 Electronic Signatures Come of Age: From Elections to Commerce and Beyond, 
INFORMATION LAWGROUP (June 23, 2010), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2010/06/ 
articles/esignatures-1/electronic-signatures-come-of-age-from-elections-to-commerce-and-
beyond. 
36 See id. 
37 2000 Utah Laws at 245 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-201). 
38 Id. 
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governmental interference with e-signatures, along with the Act’s contemplation of 
e-signatures being used outside of the commercial context, the Lieutenant 
Governor’s and the legislature’s recent stance against the use of signatures on 
petitions for both gubernatorial candidates and popular initiatives is not only 
curious, but also counter to Utah’s policy. 
Farley Anderson, gubernatorial candidate in 2010, felt acutely the effects of 
this change in legislative sentiment. On February 10, 2010, before Anderson’s 
official submission for candidacy, Lieutenant Governor Greg Bell adopted an 
opinion issued over the signature of Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff in 
which the State invalidated all electronic signatures used in the petition-gathering 
process for initiative and referenda; this also extended to gubernatorial candidates’ 
nomination packets.39 Pursuant to this “ruling,” when the Lieutenant Governor 
received Anderson’s submission, he excised all e-signatures from the candidate’s 
petition.40 Anderson’s petition thus fell short of the required minimum of 1,000 
signatures, and the Lieutenant Governor rejected it, precluding Anderson’s 
candidacy for the 2010 election.41 
Anderson responded by filing a petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which was granted.42 Although the court declined to address the 
constitutional challenges Anderson raised against the Lieutenant Governor’s action 
disallowing e-signature, it nevertheless held that electronic signatures were valid 
instruments for purposes of securing a place on the ballot for candidates 
unaffiliated with a registered political party.43 It therefore “grant[ed] Mr. Anderson 
his writ of extraordinary relief and instruct[ed] the Lt. Governor to recount the 
signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson on March 19, 2010 to determine if he ha[d] 
satisfied the requirements of section 20A-9-502.” 44  Anderson’s votes were 
recounted and, after successfully obtaining a spot on the ballot and running for 
governor in the November 2010 election, he lost by a landslide.45 
 
C.  The Enactment of S.B. 165 and the ACLU’s Response 
 
Responding to the Utah Supreme Court’s ruling, in March 2011, the Utah 
legislature passed S.B. 165, creating a categorical ban on e-signatures in Title 20, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
39 See Memorandum of Utahns for Ethical Government on the Use of E-Signatures for 
Initiatives Under Utah’s Election Code at 8, Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010) 
(No. 20100237) [hereinafter Brief for Utahns for Ethical Government]. 
40 Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147, 1148 (Utah 2010). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1149. 
43 Id. at 1156 (adhering to the principle of constitutional avoidance). 
44 Id. 
45 See Utah Election Results, UTAH.GOV, http://electionresults.utah.gov/xmlData/ 
300080.html (last visited Aug 2, 2013) (showing that Anderson received less than 2% of 
the vote, whereas Gary Herbert, winner and current governor, received over 64%). 
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Utah’s Election Code.46 This bill amended Title 20 to limit “signature” to mean “a 
holographic signature,”47 and expressly provides that “‘[s]ignature’ does not mean 
an electronic signature.” 48  Under the current form of section 20A-9-502, a 
candidate must ensure that the signature sheets contain the following declaratory 
statement imputed to each signing voter: “I have personally signed this petition 
with a holographic signature.”49 Not only did S.B. 165 reach signatures in the 
Election Code, but it also extended into the initiative and referenda context. Under 
the new statute, an electronic signature could no longer be “used to sign a petition . 
. . to qualify a ballot proposition for the ballot.”50 
Senator Curt Bramble, the bill’s sponsor when it was first presented on the 
Senate floor in 2011, argued that the intent behind the bill was to protect Utah’s 
“system of governance,” noting that “the vote is the most sacred thing that we do, 
and signing a petition is tantamount to casting a vote.”51 In order to “give clear 
direction to the courts on the matter,”52 the bill purported to resolve an apparent 
“ambiguity” that was before the legislature as to what constituted a permissible 
vote.53 Claiming that the authority to resolve this “ambiguity” was “vested in the 
legislature,”54 Bramble contended that “when citizens take it upon themselves” to 
conduct an initiative, “it is appropriate to have some strict and fairly rigorous 
standards,” such as “checks and balances,” and “clarity and certainty when it 
comes to the provisions related to the qualifying for the ballot initiative.”55 He 
concluded by saying that he believed this bill would “clarify all of those issues that 
are currently being disputed on recent initiative activities.”56 When questioned as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
46 See S.B. 165, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2011 Utah Laws 17. 
47 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-101(18)(a) (West 2012). 
48 Id. § 20A-7-101(18)(b). 
49 Id. § 20A-9-502(b)(vi) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. § 20A-1-306(1). Consider how the legislature, through Senate Bill 165, has 
managed to nest a provision in the Election Code that purports to reach to and control a 
Sixth Amendment guarantee in Utah’s Constitution. 
51 Senate Floor Debate, S.B. 165, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Mar. 7, 2011) (Senate 
audio recording, Part 2) (statement of Sen. Curt Bramble), available at http://le.utah.gov/ 
asp/audio/index.asp?House=S&Sess=2011GS (Choose “SB0165S01” from “Bill from 




54 Senate Floor Debate, S.B. 165, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Mar. 8, 2011) (Senate 
audio recording, Part 1), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?House= 
S&Sess=2011GS (Choose “SB0165S01” from “Bill from Session” form; then select 
hyperlink “Day 42 (3/8/2011)”). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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to why a blanket prohibition was necessary to achieve this clarity,57 the sponsor did 
not respond. 
Concurrent with the bill’s passage in the waning days of the 2011 legislative 
session,58 another voter referendum took root that sought to repeal House Bill 477 
(H.B. 477), “Government Records Amendments,” a controversial bill that, like 
S.B. 165, was introduced and passed rapidly through the last legislative sessions of 
2011.59 H.B. 477 amended Utah’s Government Records Access Management Act 
(GRAMA)—a law protecting citizens’ access to governmental records—to shield 
all government voice mails, instant messages, video chats, and text messages from 
public review, even when the content of those records related substantially to 
public business.60 
The grassroots referendum seeking to abolish H.B. 477 relied largely on 
electronic signatures. Therefore, on March 25, 2011, Lieutenant Governor Bell, 
acting in accordance with the blanket legislative ban imposed by S.B. 165, 
declared his refusal to recognize referendum packets that proponents sent to county 
clerks. The American Civil Liberties Union of Utah reacted quickly. 61 
Representing the cosponsors of the referendum, Janalee Tobias and Nancy Lord, 
the ACLU filed suit against the Lt. Governor that same day, contending, 
 
S.B. 165 violate[d] the state and federal constitutional rights of Utah 
voters—including those of a third ACLU client, Madison Hunt, who 
attend[ed] college out of state and who, like many Utah voters (like 
soldiers or missionaries), [could not] participate in the HB 477 
Referendum if she [was not] able do so on-line.62 
 
The ACLU specifically addressed two provisions of the Utah Constitution 
that the Lieutenant Governor, acting under the color of S.B. 165, had violated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
57 First Floor Debate, supra note 51 (statement of Sen. Ben McAdams) (expressing 
concern that S.B. 165 (First Substitute) might be moving in the “wrong direction,” and 
noting that the better course might be to explore “how we can use electronic and on-line 
means to involve the public in this process”). 
58 Bramble presented S.B. 165 to the legislature on the forty-second and forty-third 
days of the 2011 General Legislative Session. Id. It passed the House and was put into 
effect on March 10, 2011, the forty-fifth and last day of the General Session. See S.B. 165, 
59th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2011 Utah Laws 17; see also UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 16, cl. 2 
(limiting sessions called by the governor to thirty days unless for impeachment purposes). 
59  See Unconstitutional E-Signatures Ban Results in Lawsuit, ACLU OF UTAH, 
http://www.acluutah.org/SB165lawsuit.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
60  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief at 1, Lord v. Bell, No. 20110259 (Utah Mar. 25, 2011). 
61 See Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, Lord v. Bell, No. 20110259 (Utah 
Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.acluutah.org/SB165_Petition_Extraordinary_ 
Writ_032511.pdf, withdrawn Mar. 31, 2011. 
62 Unconstitutional E-Signatures Ban Results in Lawsuit, supra note 59. 
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his outright refusal to accept signature packets that Tobias and Lord had collected 
in their referendum: first, the petitioners argued that S.B. 165 patently contravened 
Utahns’ constitutionally vested and fundamental right to initiate legislation and 
hold referenda on “any law passed by the Legislature”;63 second, petitioners 
claimed that the ban on e-signatures ran afoul of Utah’s uniform operation of laws 
provision, which requires that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation.”64 Central to the ACLU’s constitutional challenge was their theory 
under the uniform operation of laws provision that S.B. 165 created discriminatory 
class distinctions and treated similarly situated voters differently.65 By engaging in 
what amounted to an equal protection analysis, petitioners relied largely upon the 
Utah Supreme Court’s rationale in Gallivan v. Walker, where the court struck 
down a multicounty ballot initiative petition signature requirement that diluted 
urban votes in favor of votes from less-populous rural counties.66 
Only hours after the ACLU filed its petition, the legislature voted to repeal 
H.B. 477 amidst a torrent of public opposition to the bill.67 The ACLU then 
voluntarily withdrew its petition challenging S.B. 165 and the Lieutenant 
Governor’s refusal of e-signatures.68 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
While the ACLU correctly situated its attack on S.B. 165 within Utah’s 
constitutional protection of initiative and referenda, it relied too much on 
Gallivan’s uniform operation of laws analysis. A free speech analysis provides an 
alternative and sharper lens through which to scrutinize the legislature’s violations. 
As the government’s prohibition on initiative e-signatures is categorical and 
extends to all residents with a vested liberty interest in the franchise, pursuing a 
constitutional claim under the First Amendment strikes at the heart of the unilateral 
actions taken by the Lieutenant Governor and the Utah legislature. The evil 
inherent in these state actions arises precisely out of their indiscriminating, 
unequivocal burden on the franchise and their blanket silencing of core political 
speech. The following sections will address specifically how a free speech 
challenge improves upon the uniform operation of laws complaint levied in 
Gallivan, how S.B. 165 directly targets Utahns’ First Amendment interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
63  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief, supra note 60, at 4–5 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1); see also 
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081–82 (Utah 2002) (holding that the right to “directly 
legislate through initiative and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right”). 
64  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief, supra note 60, at 6–18 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24). 
65 Id. at 8–12. 
66 54 P.3d at 1087–88. 
67 See Unconstitutional E-Signatures Ban Results in Lawsuit, supra note 59. 
68 Id. 
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political discourse, why it deserves the strictest scrutiny of the court, and how it 
must fail such scrutiny. 
 
A. Why Free Speech Cuts Deeper than Gallivan’s Uniform Operation of Laws 
Analysis 
 
In Gallivan, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a different kind of limitation 
on the initiative-gathering process. At the time Gallivan was decided—in 2002—
the legislature had included a multicounty distribution provision requiring petition 
circulators to obtain signatures from at least twenty of the twenty-nine counties 
equal to 10% of all votes cast for candidates for governor in the last regular general 
election.69 This multicounty distribution requirement was intended to incorporate a 
greater geographical cross section of the Utah electorate. It precluded petition 
gatherers from getting initiatives onto the statewide ballot by concentrating their 
efforts solely on urban areas. This, as the court noted, created a situation in which 
“rural counties . . . wield[ed] a disproportionate amount of power in the 
determination of whether an initiative qualifie[d] to be placed on the ballot.”70 The 
court found that the statutory provision created “two subclasses of registered 
voters: those who reside in rural counties and those who reside in urban 
counties.”71 Rural county voters had an effective veto power over the larger urban 
demographic. 
Given this disproportionate allocation of franchise powers, a uniform 
operation of laws analysis was appropriate because it squarely targeted the unequal 
effects on the franchise invited by a multicounty distribution requirement. Article 
1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: “All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation.”72 This provision shares with the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution “the same general principle: persons similarly 
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.”73 The Gallivan court held 
that the class distinctions resulting from the multicounty distribution provision 
were discriminatory because they had “the effect of diluting the power of urban 
registered voters and heightening the power of rural registered voters in relation to 
an initiative petition, thereby treating similarly situated registered voters 
disparately.”74 Although petitioners had levied free speech challenges in their brief, 
the court declined to address them because it had already determined a violation of 
fundamental rights had occurred under the uniform operation of laws analysis.75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
69 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(2)(a) (West 2012) (amended in 2003 and 2011). 
70 Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1086–87. 
71 Id. at 1086.  
72 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24. 
73 Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1083–84. 
74 Id. at 1086–87. 
75 Id. at 1097. 
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In Anderson’s case, however, where the legislature has created a uniform 
prohibition on e-signatures, no such concern for disproportionate treatment of the 
electorate exists. Given the blanket nature of the prohibition and the fact that it 
infringes on the fundamental right of everyone with access to a computer and 
Internet service, a uniform operation of laws analysis is not germane to a challenge 
against it. In fact, inviting the court to engage in such analysis may prove self-
defeating. While plaintiffs generally contemplate two subclasses of voters affected 
by the ban on e-signatures—Utahns residing in-state and those located out of 
state—a uniform operation of laws analysis may invite the court to scrutinize the 
“digital gap” separating some disadvantaged groups from Internet access. As 
Alvarez and Hall note, “Individuals who connect to the Internet at home tend to be 
white, wealthy, well educated, male, and Republican.”76 Therefore, even among 
the members of the electorate who do have Internet service, the quality of that 
access varies in proportion to socioeconomic status. Those who cannot afford high-
speed services may be perceived as disadvantaged in the voting process.77 
Whether these disparities in fact create substantial obstacles to the franchise is 
subject to debate. A uniform operation of laws analysis, however, when conducted 
over the several counties of Utah—with their disparities in race and socioeconomic 
status—may result in the court upholding the legislative ban on e-signatures. This 
possibility of backfiring underscores that the uniform operation of laws challenge 
is not well suited to address S.B. 165. In sum, the government’s categorical ban on 
e-signatures should not be analyzed under an equal protection rubric, but instead, 
as demonstrated below, under the First Amendment’s guarantee of protecting 
citizens’ right to engage in core political speech. 
 
B.  Why Electronic Signatures on Initiatives Are Protected Speech 
 
While Gallivan did not analyze Utahns’ right to initiative under the First 
Amendment, its central holding rested on basic fundamental principles of free 
speech. When the court acknowledged that “[t]he initiative right encourages 
political dialogue and allows the general populace to have substantive and 
meaningful participation in enacting legislation that impacts society,” 78  it 
highlighted both the expressive and communicative political interaction that 
initiatives foster. This type of political discourse “is democracy in its most direct 
and quintessential form.”79 Therefore, although Gallivan declined to reach the 
petitioner’s free-speech challenges, these basic First Amendment rights were 
integral to its constitutional analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
76 ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 22, at 8. 
77 See id. 
78 Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1081. 
79 Id. 
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The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”80 The 
Fourteenth Amendment makes this provision applicable to Utah.81 Freedom of 
speech means an assurance of “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of social changes desired by the people.”82 In Meyer v. Grant,83 the Supreme 
Court explained that the circulation of a petition for state initiatives and referenda 
“involves the type of interactive communication . . . that is appropriately described 
as ‘core political speech.’” 84  Furthermore, one’s signature on such petitions 
expresses the political view that the whole electorate should consider the issue 
raised by the initiative, and thus each signature deserves the same core 
protections.85 
Meyer followed an earlier decision in which the Court recognized solicitation 
of charitable contributions as speech protected by the First Amendment.86 The 
Court based its recognition of the circulation of initiatives and referenda as core 
political speech upon their similar tendency to advance certain speech interests—
“‘communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and 
ideas, and the advocacy of causes.’”87 As the Court noted, 
 
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable 
regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the 
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative 
and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or 
for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the 
reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and 
advocacy would likely cease.88 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(incorporating the Free Speech Clause); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 
707 (1931) (incorporating the Free Press Clause), DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 
(1937) (incorporating the Free Assembly Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
304 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 
8 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause). 
82 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
83 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
84 Id. at 421–22. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 422 n.5 (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 
(1980)). 
87 Id. (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632). 
88 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. 
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In Meyer, the Court similarly directed its focus towards protecting the 
marketplace of political ideas. Indeed, initiatives and referenda are geared more 
specifically at engaging this market, as they seek out not a passive payment, but 
rather an active political voice expressed in signature. It is in this sense that 
initiatives and referenda constitute core political speech. Electronic signatures, no 
less than holographic signatures, stand for a vital moment in political discourse—
when political advocacy has reached out and affected constituents of the franchise. 
The electronic signature memorializes both the politically expressive conduct of 
the voter and the persuasive communication preceding it. 
 
C.  Why Recent Title 20 Amendments Deserve the Strictest Scrutiny 
 
Utah citizens have reserved the power to propose legislation and nominate 
political candidates by initiative petition. As shown in Section III.B above, this 
power emanates not only from Article VI of the Utah Constitution, but also from 
the First Amendment’s protection of interactive political speech, and the Utah 
legislature may not restrict, dilute, or otherwise limit those powers unless they can 
do so by passing a law that survives strict scrutiny.89 “Restrictions on access to the 
ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, the right of individuals to 
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters 
. . . to cast their votes effectively.”90 
Accordingly, the legislature’s decision to amend provisions of Utah’s Election 
Code to deny voters the right to circulate ballot petitions electronically is “subject 
to exacting scrutiny.”91 The blanket exclusion of e-signatures places “burden[s] on 
political expression,”92 and “trenches upon an area in which the importance of First 
Amendment protections is ‘at its zenith,’”93 thus “inevitabl[y] . . . reducing the 
total quantum of speech on a public issue.”94 As such, these restrictions “are to be 
closely scrutinized and narrowly construed.”95 The government must first show 
that S.B. 165 advances a compelling interest. If it can clear that hurdle, it must still 
show that the bill is as narrowly tailored as possible to address that interest. The 
government, having assumed a burden that “is well-nigh insurmountable,”96 cannot 
do either. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
89 See Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999). 
90 Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420. 
92 Id. at 428. 
93 Id. at 425. 
94 Id. at 423; see also Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 184. 
95 Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423 (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760, 763 (Colo. 
1983)). 
96 Id. at 425. 
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D.  S.B. 165’s Ballot Access Restriction Creates an Undue Burden on First 
Amendment Rights 
 
When ballot access restrictions impose a “severe” burden on the electorate, 
they are subject to strict scrutiny and cannot pass muster unless narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest.97 In examining a law that severely infringes 
upon the franchise, a court must “consider[] the facts and circumstances behind the 
law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those 
who are disadvantaged by the classification.”98 Strict scrutiny of the government’s 
position means weighing “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”99 The interests 
put forward by S.B. 165’s sponsor hardly justify the character and magnitude of 
the injury that the bill imposes upon voters. 
 
1.  None of the Legislature’s Purported Concerns Justify the Enactment of S.B. 165 
 
First, Senator Bramble’s stated interest in resolving an apparent 
“ambiguity”100 cannot survive even rational basis review. Prior to the enactment of 
S.B. 165, the Utah Code specifically contemplated the use of electronic signatures 
for initiatives and referenda. Section 68-3-12 imposed clear “[r]ules of 
construction” for interpreting provisions like those contained in section 20A-9-
502, upon which Anderson relied in collecting e-signatures to secure candidacy. 
The statute clearly defined “signature” to include a “name, mark, or sign written 
with the intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.”101 The legislature further 
clarified the meaning of “writing” as “printing,” “handwriting,” and “information 
stored in an electronic or other medium if the information is retrievable in a 
perceivable format.”102 The statutory instruments provided in section 68-3-12 left 
no room for ambiguity. 
Assuming arguendo that any doubt remained, however, the Utah Supreme 
Court resolved it in Anderson v. Bell. There, the court held that electronic 
signatures unambiguously constitute valid signatures under section 20A-9-502.103 
While Bramble claimed that S.B. 165’s purpose was to provide “direction to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
97 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
98 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 30 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
100 First Floor Debate, supra note 51. 
101 UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12.5(26) (West 2012) (renumbered in 2011). 
102 Id. § 68-3-12.5(35)(a)–(c) (emphasis added). 
103 Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Utah 2010). 
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courts” and “clarify the intent of the legislature” in the wake of Anderson,104 the 
legislature was not at liberty to make its intent clear at the expense of Utah voters’ 
fundamental rights of initiative and referenda.105 Therefore the State’s asserted 
interest in clearing up confusion in the law by enacting S.B. 165 cannot survive 
even rational basis review. 
Second, the government’s purported interest in fraud prevention, while 
important, cannot withstand a least restrictive means test under Burdick v. 
Takushi,106 which forces the government to marshal a precise justification and 
show why the law is necessary.107 While Senator Bramble contends that S.B. 165 
disposes of a difficulty in the verification process of signatures and thereby 
maintains the integrity of that process,108 he fails to specify what this difficulty 
entails. He similarly fails to marshal an exact explanation of how using electronic 
signatures compromises the integrity of the verification process, and he does not 
provide any statistical basis for his already highly generalized grievances. He has 
thus fallen woefully short of the demands imposed by Burdick, which require him 
to articulate a precise and compelling interest underlying the legislature’s 
injunction.109 
Assuming that by referring to the integrity of the verification process, the 
Senator meant to address potential fraudulent practices involving electronic 
signatures, the government’s position is still unavailing. This argument was 
considered and rejected in Anderson.110 Given the court’s disposition of this issue, 
along with the advances in e-signature verification technology since Anderson was 
decided, the government’s interest in maintaining security of the vote cannot meet 
the standard under strict scrutiny, which requires a “compelling” interest. 
Moreover, even assuming the interest is compelling, the government has 
presented no specific findings to show that S.B. 165 is narrowly tailored to its 
stated interest in fraud prevention. Recent studies show that new digital encryption 
used in e-signing has not only leant authenticity to the electronic signature, but has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
104 First Floor Debate, supra note 51. 
105 See Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1090 n.11 (Utah 2002) (holding that “the 
legislature is not free to enact restrictions on constitutionally established and guaranteed 
rights and powers whenever it perceives that the system of checks and balances is 
misaligned or out of equilibrium”); see also discussion supra Section III.B (arguing that 
electronic signatures, under Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), are constitutionally 
protected speech). 
106 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
107 Id. at 534. 
108 First Floor Debate, supra note 51. 
109 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 534. 
110 See Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147, 1155 n.7 (Utah 2010) (“We are unpersuaded 
that an electronic signature presents special concerns regarding candidate fraud; a 
candidate could as easily handwrite or type fraudulent names onto a certificate of 
nomination.”). 
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also allowed voters to maintain their anonymity by encrypting the signature until 
verification is necessary.111 A Stanford graduate student—Rebecca Bellovin—has 
analyzed how these advances in public key cryptography have enabled election 
boards (and by analogy, county clerks) to verify the authenticity of the signor 
while maintaining the secrecy of the vote. Bellovin shows that, “with sufficient 
redundancy in the encryption scheme . . . [public key cryptography is] vanishingly 
unlikely to disenfranchise legitimate voters.”112 
Several critics of e-voting have referenced a 2004 report issued by a panel of 
computer security experts called upon by the U.S. Department of Defense to 
analyze potential security risks in the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting 
Experiment (SERVE).113 SERVE, an experiment in online voting conducted by the 
Department of Defense to open the franchise to military personnel overseas, was 
test-run by Utah, as well as Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Washington during the 2004 national election.114 The panelists’ 
report criticized SERVE for having “fundamental security problems that leave it 
vulnerable to a variety of well-known cyber attacks (insider attacks, denial of 
service attacks, spoofing, automated vote buying, viral attacks on voter PCs, etc.), 
any one of which,” they argue, “could be catastrophic.”115 
However, the Vista Voter Registration System 116  deployed by petition 
circulators in Utah and similar jurisdictions reduces the risk of fraud for three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
111  See Rebecca Bellovin, Cryptography: Authentication, Blind Signatures, and 
Digital Cash 1–4 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished graduate note, Stanford University) (on file 
with Department of Mathematics, Stanford) (crediting David Chaum, Blind Signatures for 
Untraceable Payments, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF CRYPTO 82, at 
199 (David Chaum et al. eds., 1983); David Chaum et al., Untraceable Electronic Cash, in 
LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE: ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY – CRYPTO 88, at 
319 (Shafi Goldwasser ed., 1990), available at http://math.stanford.edu/~rmbellov/ 
writings/chaum.pdf. 
112 Id. at 4; see ADOBE SYS., INC., ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES: SOLUTION SCENARIOS 
FOR YOUR IT ENVIRONMENT 3 (2008) [hereinafter ADOBE WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.evolutionbook.it/documenti/presentazioni/Electronic%20signatures%20-%20 
Solution%20scenarios%20for%20your%20IT%20environment.pdf. 
113 DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) (2004). 
114 John Schwartz, Report Says Internet Voting System Is Too Insecure to Use, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/21/technology/23CND-
INTE.html. 
115 JEFFERSON ET AL., supra note 113, at 2; see also R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. 
HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 84 
(2008) (Alvarez and Hall outline the SERVE project and note, importantly, that “the report 
did not directly criticize the SERVE system or its architecture. Instead, the problem with 
Internet voting is with the Internet itself” where any transaction—“from buying a book to 
e-filing your taxes—is dangerous when done online.”). 
116 See Brief for Utahns for Ethical Government, supra note 39. 
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reasons. First, it borrows upon the same encryption technology used to secure 
commercial transactions, thus providing a means of authenticating e-voters’ 
identities while maintaining their anonymity. As Alvarez and Hall have noted in 
regard to such registration systems, “voters can be required to use password-
protected digital certificates to authenticate themselves . . . and if any attempt is 
made to read or alter the ballot, both the voter and election officials can detect the 
attempt.”117 Second, clerks engaged in the process of verifying the voter against a 
central database can rely exclusively on a voter registration system that performs 
cross-checks electronically, thus mitigating human error.118 Third, political and 
market pressures will continue to increase cybersecurity for online voting. Given 
that the technology supporting secure commercial transactions has historically 
been the same as that used for online voting, and private groups had made 
cybersafety a primary condition on lending,119 local governmental databases will 
no doubt draw from these private innovations in security to protect the e-vote. 
Furthermore, court-imposed sanctions for voter fraud online will reinforce the 
cybersecurity of the e-signature and the vote it memorializes. Because commercial 
and governmental databases are subject to cyber attacks, their stewards benefit 
materially by cooperating to mitigate these risks. In sum, the Utah legislature’s 
lack of specificity in articulating its interests and its failure to marshal any precise 
evidence to justify its concerns for voter fraud are fatal to S.B. 165’s legacy. 
Finally, the Utah legislature’s categorical ban on electronic signatures was not 
“necessary” under Burdick because the government could have deployed less 
restrictive means to prevent voter fraud. As an alternative to an outright prohibition 
on such signatures, the legislature could have promulgated rules to guide the 
verification process, requiring county clerks to follow certain procedures while 
confirming the identity of the e-signer. The difficulty of the procedure currently 
followed by county clerks, who must mechanically verify each holographic 
signature against an electronic database,120 further exposes the attenuated link 
between the government’s action and its justification. The current manual 
verification process not only offers a potentially worse alternative to voter-fraud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
117 ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 22, at 90. 
118  In fact, Utahns for Ethical Government has noted that the county clerks’ 
certification process, under the initiative statute, has nothing to do with “testing” signatures 
for form or authenticity. Because the clerks are not forensic experts at handwriting 
analysis, their role is limited to determining “whether or not each signer is a registered 
voter according to the requirements of Section 20A-7-206.3.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-
206(3)(a)–(b) (West 2012). Therefore, the Vista system adds a forensics mechanism where 
none existed beforehand. 
119 ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 22, at 96–99. 
120 New provisions in the Election Code established by S.B 165 require county clerks 
to determine whether each holographic petition signature “appears substantially similar to 
the signature on the statewide voter registration database.” S.B. 165, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess., 
2011 Utah Laws 17. 
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prevention; it also requires more time and tax dollars. Since S.B. 165 patently 
silences core political speech, while providing no alternative mechanism for voters 
who have been denied the franchise by its injunction on e-signatures, none of the 
government’s stated interests can support it.121 
 
2.  The Nature and Magnitude of the Harm Brought Upon Utah Voters Constitutes 
an Undue Burden on Speech 
 
While the legislature may provide reasonable regulations regarding the 
procedure for signature verification, these regulations may not disenfranchise 
voters who nonfraudulently sign onto an initiative. 122  These procedural 
requirements rise to the level of an undue burden when a “reasonably diligent” 
initiative proponent could, absent the regulation, normally qualify a statutory 
initiative. 123  Although the Utah Constitution grants limited authority to the 
legislature to set certain conditions and requirements for exercise of the 
referendum right, it may not abuse that authority by making preemptive attacks on 
voters’ First Amendment rights or expand its own unchecked powers in the 
process. 
Both the Lieutenant Governor and the Utah legislature have engaged in 
precisely this kind of abuse of power by making rules that insulate government 
from the voting public. The Lieutenant Governor acted first in 2010 to issue a 
ruling that divested Farley Anderson of his candidacy by declaring void all of his 
petition votes that had been signed electronically. By doing so, Lieutenant 
Governor Bell stepped outside his constitutionally defined sphere of authority and 
exercised unbridled control over Anderson and his supporters’ speech interests.124 
While the Lieutenant Governor still demurs to his claimed authority as “chief 
election officer,” under section 67-1a-2(2)(a) of the Utah Code, this “general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
121 For a new perspective on a working paradigm for online voting, see ALVAREZ & 
HALL, supra note 115, at 156–78 (providing the outline for a risk management model that 
would serve to negotiate the risks inherent to any online transaction and proposing a 
rigorous oversight process that, like the FDA’s process of regulating drug manufacturing, 
would better position states to certify that local voting efforts are conducted in accordance 
with best practices). 
122 See Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging 
that “states may not place overly restrictive conditions on citizens attempting to exercise 
initiative or referendum rights”). 
123 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974). 
124 See Brief for Utahns for Ethical Government, supra note 39, at 11 n.21 (outlining 
the Lieutenant Governor’s statutorily imposed duties in counting initiative signatures and 
illustrating that the Utah Supreme Court “has not been persuaded” that his “ministerial” 
role “should be expanded . . . to include general oversight and fraud prevention”) (citing 
Page v. McKeachnie, 97 P.3d 1290 (Utah 2004); Cope v. Toronto, 332 P.2d 977, 978–79 
(Utah 1958)). 
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supervisory” authority does not vest him with the discretion to make extrastatutory 
pronouncements that disenfranchise nonfraudulent supporters of initiative and 
referenda. Even under the color of S.B. 165, the State’s continued encroachment 
on Utahns’ core political speech interests leaves the “reasonably diligent” 
prospective candidate125 with limited options for pursuing a spot on the ballot. 
In sum, the State has imposed an undue burden on voters’ ballot access, a 
speech interest that resides at the heart of a community-driven government. Since 
the legislature, whose intent has been articulated by Senator Bramble, can provide 
no valid, let alone compelling, justification for S.B. 165’s enactment, it must be 
ruled unconstitutional. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Senator Bramble correctly noted that “the vote is the most sacred thing that 
we do, and signing a petition is tantamount to casting a vote.”126 However, the 
legislature’s endorsement of S.B. 165 runs counter to this constitutional principle. 
Where the right to “directly legislate through initiative and referenda is sacrosanct 
and a fundamental,”127 the government may not stand between the circulators of a 
political message and their audience. 
The voting public witnessed the effects of such unwarranted interposition 
when the Lieutenant Governor nearly prevented Farley Anderson from claiming 
his right to candidacy in 2010. Since then, the Utah legislature and Lieutenant 
Governor have continued to disregard a constitutional mandate deeply rooted in 
the public’s right to engage in the marketplace of political ideas by decertifying 
electronic signatures and excising quanta of speech in the franchise. 
This continued abuse of the franchise has wide-reaching effects. Voters 
residing temporarily out of the state, such as Madison Hunt, who joined as 
petitioner in suit against Lieutenant Governor Bell in 2011, have limited recourse 
in light of the State’s categorical ban on e-signatures.128  As the ACLU has 
indicated, the State’s injunction negatively affects missionaries who have been 
assigned to locations outside of Utah, and also may prevent soldiers from taking 
part in important referenda that affect the state they are charged, in part, with 
defending. The ban also presents obstacles for college students attending out-of-
state universities who still retain Utah residency from engaging in a vital, 
educational discourse. In short, S.B. 165 divests out-of-state residents of the 
franchise and imposes an unnecessary burden on in-state residents’ access to the 
ballot. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
125 Storer, 415 U.S. at 742. 
126 First Floor Debate, supra note 51. 
127 Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081–82 (Utah 2002). 
128 See Unconstitutional E-Signatures Ban Results in Lawsuit, supra note 59. 
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Given these constitutional ills, it is only a matter of time before the bill will be 
struck down. The ACLU has stated its intention to remain vigilant in scrutinizing 
the government’s treatment of initiative signatures and has promised to “pursue 
whatever challenge, in whatever forum, that will best protect the rights of all Utah 
voters to participate fully in the petitioning process.” 129  Since the court in 
Anderson already affirmed the validity of electronic signatures in Title 20 through 
statutory rules of construction and common law principles, it will likely have to 
address the constitutional challenges it declined to reach in that case when it is 
visited with new challenges to the State’s ban on e-signatures in ballot petitions 
and initiatives. This Note offers an alternative to the uniform operation of laws 
analysis, which plaintiffs have recently employed against the Lieutenant Governor 
and S.B. 165. Free speech analysis supplies parameters that are more closely suited 
to address the type of constitutional wrong that the Lieutenant Governor 
committed and that the legislature has recently upheld. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
129 Id. ACLU of Utah Legal Director Darcy M. Goddard issued a public statement on 
March 30, 2011, insisting that the ACLU “still intend[ed] to challenge SB 165’s blanket 
ban on e-signatures offered in support of citizens’ referenda and initiatives . . . [and to] 
protect the rights of all Utah voters to participate fully in the petitioning process.” Given 
Legislative Repeal of HB 477, ACLU of Utah Voluntarily Withdraws Supreme Court 
Petition, ACLU OF UTAH, http://www.acluutah.org/SB165033011.html (last visited August 
12, 2013). 
